We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in population; as a matter of fact, it is the Han nationality whose population is large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich. (Mao 1986, 47) .
Although much water has passed under the bridge in political, economic and ideological terms since Mao Zedong's utterance, it would appear that the sentiment expressed therein retains a powerful hold over the contemporary Chinese state's approach to its geographically and culturally diverse ethnic minority populations. Most particularly, since Jiang Zemin's launching of the Great Western Development (Xibu da kaifa) program in June 1999, Mao's observation regarding the disposition of geography and population between China's ethnic minorities and the majority Han, has assumed a new importance. Although this campaign can be seen as "an amorphous set of diverse policy agendas and instruments not designed to form a complete and coherent programme, but rather appeal to as many interests as possible simultaneously", it nonetheless appears to have one major guiding principle -the more thorough integration of China's predominantly ethnic minority populated "western regions" (Holbig 2004, 335-338) . This paper suggests that a number of key challenges to China's security stem from its ongoing, and recently revitalised and reinforced, project to integrate the "interior" provinces in the form of the Great Western Development campaign. This campaign is not simply a regional one, but a national one with potentially international implications. As the scope and immensity of this program and the diversity of the regions encompassed by it are impossible to address in this brief discussion, the paper will focus on one region in order to illustrate the security dilemmas for the state that are stemming from its accelerated integrationist project.
1 The "Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region" forms an instructive "test case" for the proposed argumentation and theoretical framework because it encompasses a broad sweep of potentialities that could challenge the state's "internal security" into the 21 st century.
2 Drawing upon some notions of "human security" from International Relations (IR) theory that will be explored and related to the Chinese context below, the paper suggests that the Chinese state can be conceived of as confronting an "internal" security dilemma in
Xinjiang that is largely of its own making. Ultimately, in the context of an ethnic minority region such as Xinjiang, this security dilemma is focused on the relationship between security and identity. In particular, it is proposed that the rise of ethnic nationalism and even "terrorism" in Xinjiang has at its core an essential contestation of identities reflected in the state's discourse of development and security. As such it encompasses a disjuncture or tension between the aims and strategies of the state's developmental project, their impact on regional socio-economic conditions and the evolution of ethnic identities. Utilising the concept of the societal security dilemma this paper suggests that the actions of the Chinese state in attempting to ensure the "security" of such regions as Xinjiang are in fact generating dynamics of insecurity amongst the region's non-Han ethnic groups. Through a discussion and analysis of state policy in Xinjiang and the discourse that surrounds it, the paper proposes that the state has made a significant shift in the way it perceives the nature of its dilemma in Xinjiang and the most efficacious means to address it. Moreover, it will also be suggested that the issue of Uighur "terrorism" has effectively been "securitized" through the deployment of an ascriptive state discourse over the preceding decade that portrays the issue of Uighur separatism as intimately connected to a triumvirate of radical Islam, under-development and international "terrorism" that presents a challenge to "national unity". First, the paper begins by sketching the broad brushstrokes of the application of the theories of human security, in particular the notion of a "security dilemma" to intra-state conflict (in the case of Xinjiang inter-ethnic conflict). Subsequently, the paper identifies the ways in which such a framework is applicable to the case of Xinjiang, drawing on a historical analysis of Chinese policy in the region since 1949 but with particular emphasis on the 1990 to 2006 period.
The Societal Security Dilemma and the Case of Xinjiang
An under-examined facet of "security" concerns questions of identity. Adopting some notions of "human security" from IR scholarship will allow us to place the issue of identity at the core of "security" concerns. In particular, the concept of the "security dilemma", common in IR theory, can be brought into the state to provide a framework through which to address the issue of identity in China's security concerns. The basic concept as it stands in IR theory rests upon the notion that the actions of a state to enhance its security produce reactions that can make it less secure via inducing insecurity in other states regarding its intentions in the acquisition of arms, for example. In essence the security dilemma is primarily concerned with the juxtaposition of the actors' intentions -security -and the outcome of their policies/actions -insecurity. In the IR conception of the security dilemma it is the sovereignty of the state that is the object of security, thus leading to a focus on military capabilities of states in some IR analysis of the security dilemma. But if our focus or field of inquiry is within the state, for example the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China, the object of security changes. According to scholars such as Buzan, Roe and Waever, for example, what is at issue in security terms within the state is the concept of "societal security" (Buzan 1991, 122-23; Waever 1993, 24-25; Roe 2005) . As its label suggests, societal security concerns itself with the security of collectivities or "societies". According to Waever et al, there is a distinction between state security and societal security: state security is generally conceived of as concerned with protecting the sovereignty of the state from external threats, while societal security is concerned with threats to identity. Both, however, relate to survival: if a state loses its sovereignty it will not survive as a state, while if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society. In a world of nation-states there is generally more than one such collectivity or society aspiring or claiming identity as an ethnic group or nation within the territorial bounds of the state. Indeed, this is certainly the case given the great ethnic diversity of the population of contemporary China. This produces a duality whereby the state can be undermined by threats to its constituent societies, while state security can also be weakened or compromised by a high-level of societal cohesion. For example, a state's program of "nationbuilding" or integration may come into conflict with the identity of one of its constituent societal groups. In the case of China, an increasingly Han conception of Chinese nationalism and Han-dominated state discourse, could be seen to be coming into conflict with the assertion of various ethnic minority identities. Importantly, the societal security literature
suggests that when such a situation occurs it creates an excessive concern with state securitya dynamic that this paper will suggest is exhibited in the actions and discourse of the contemporary Chinese state.
One of the most salient features of contemporary China that contributes significantly to this excessive concern with state security is the political, strategic and cultural significance of its diverse population. Thus, although the fifty-five officially recognised ethnic minorities constitute only eight and a half per cent of China's population according to the 2000 census, they are concentrated in 64.3% of the country's total land area and 90% of China's border regions (Zhu & Blachford 2006, 330 (Forbes 1986; Wang 1999) . 4 Significantly, for this discussion, Waever defines "societies" as "politically significant ethno-national and religious identities" (Waever 1993, 22) , a definition into which the Uighur clearly fall. Moreover, he clearly highlights the central dilemma that such identities may pose for the state:
…societal identity is one that it is not only robust enough in construction, and comprehensive enough in its following, but also broad enough in the quality of the identity it carries, to enable it to compete with the territorial state as a political organizing principle. A societal identity is able to reproduce itself independently of the state and even in opposition to the state's organisational principle (Waever 1993, 23 ).
Therefore, the major issue that this perspective highlights in the Chinese context is the potential for the development of an emerging disjuncture between the interests of the state and the identity of its predominant population, the Han, and those of the officially recognised ethnic minorities. As noted above, societal security is focused on identity. Thus, an internal "security dilemma" exists when societal security, that is to say when the identity of a constituent element of a state's population is threatened. However, the question that needs to be asked, is how? According to Roe, societal security is threatened when a society believes that its "we" identity is being put in danger, whether this is objectively the case or simply perceived. He argues, that, "Those means that can threaten societal identity range from the suppression of its expression to interference with its ability to reproduce itself across generations" (Roe 2005, 48) . Thus a wide range of state action may threaten the reproduction of identity; from restrictions on the use of language, dress, control or closure of places of education and worship, deportation or killing of members of the community and state-induced population change. This is important for a discussion of "internal security" in contemporary China as the "security dilemma", framed by the concept of societal security suggests that security actions are always taken on behalf of, and with reference to, a particular collectivity.
Moreover, the societal security literature also postulates that an issue becomes "securitized" through a discursive process on behalf of the state. This "securitization theory" argues that security issues are constructed "according to a dialectic between securitizing state agents and an accepting or rejecting public audience, mediated by a stock discourse of security characteristics such as urgency and exceptionality" (Neal 2006, 34) . What is significant to take from these approaches in addressing the Chinese context is to consider a number of questions regarding "security". First, which collectivity is the state acting to protect? Second, once that choice is made, how do the actions taken to protect the security of the state impact upon the societal security of the constituent populations of the state? Third, does the Chinese state's actions and discourse exhibit a "securitization" dynamic whereby key issues are deemed to be defined by "urgency" and "exceptionality"? With these questions in mind, a discussion of the goals, policies and outcomes of the state's Great Western Development, with specific examples from Xinjiang, may provide some possible answers to these questions.
It will emerge that the state is increasingly acting to ensure the security of the dominant societal group -the Han -and that this process, exhibited in the state's political, economic and ideological program, may be threatening the societal security of its ethnic minority populations and ultimately contribute to the development of potential internal "security dilemmas". Finally, the "stand out" issue that demonstrates the Chinese state's "securitizing" tendency is the notion of Uighur "terrorism" in Xinjiang.
The Discourse of the "Great Western Development"
It is perhaps instructive, in the context of some of the comments/observations noted above, to define where exactly this campaign is targeted. What constitutes the "West" in this campaign has changed on occasion since the initiation of the campaign in 1999, yet is clear that it is more than a simple geographic designation. By 2001 fourteen "western provinces and autonomous regions" were deemed to constitute the focus of the Great Western Development -the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, the municipality of Chongqing and the autonomous regions of Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, the Xiangxi Tujia-Miao Autonomous prefecture (Hunan) and the Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture (Jilin) (Goodman 2004, 320) . As this list demonstrates, however, these regions are not exclusively "western" given that the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region, for example, has a southern coastline. However, the majority of the regions identified are characterised by economic under-development, lack of infrastructure, large/significant numbers of ethnic minorities and are far into the interior of the landmass. As such this "west", with Inner Mongolia encompassing much of China's northern border and Guangxi abutting the economic powerhouse of Guangdong, is thus a political, economic and even ideological designation. One observer has noted that the, "Western Development is a framework in which the discourse of historical, social, cultural and political interaction is conducted" (Sines 2002, 6 ).
The general tenor of this complex discourse can be characterised as simultaneously paternalistic and disdainful of the ethnic minorities, portraying the ethnic minorities as "younger brothers and sisters" that require the assistance of the more advanced (ie. modern) "elder brother" Han in order overcome their social and material backwardness (Sines 2002) . This is coupled with the official and popular representations of China's ethnic minoritiesthrough tourism, films, pictorial representations etc -as primitive or exotic in contradistinction to the more reserved representation of the Han, who Gladney notes are generally portrayed in western-style, and "modest", clothing (Gladney 2004, 51-84) . The implication is clear -the ethnic minorities represent "traditional", colourful and ultimately "backward" societies, whereas the Han represent modernity. A recent example of such representations of the amorphous and primitive "West", in particular of Xinjiang, can be seen in Ang Lee's film, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon. In the film, Xinjiang is portrayed as a wild, desolate and remote (both geographically and culturally) frontier landscape. As a number of observers have noted regarding this representation, Xinjiang is portrayed as the frontier in perpetuity, a land of both great opportunity and great challenges (Sines 2002, 6; Tyler 2003) . Thus, both the regions of the "West" and the peoples that inhabit them are portrayed as forming a duality of under-development and opportunity for the Chinese nationstate. How does this "oriental orientalism", as Gladney would have it, correlate with the contours of the Western Development Campaign and the notions of societal security outlined above?
Perhaps most important, is that this perception of the ethnic minorities and the amorphous "west" that they inhabit is clearly informing the trajectory of the Great West Development in terms of both goals and policies. Significantly, the campaign is conceived as a state and nation-building one. The relationship between state and nation, however, under the PRC has been problematic, with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) simultaneously embracing the discourse of the nation-state and multi-nationalism. The former emphasises the commitment to economic development and modernization, while the latter emphasises the state's intended inclusivity toward its ethnic minority population. Thus, there has been since the formation of the PRC an inherent tension, and perhaps a hidden source of potential conflict, between these two discourses:
In the view of the state, a citizen of the PRC is in some sense a national (guomin) whether they are Han or not. Necessarily the viability of this position depends on the extent to which the state-idea of the PRC is accepted in the population itself, both Han Chinese and other nationalities (minzu) (Goodman 2004, 325 . My emphasis).
This dynamic has been reflected in the practice of Chinese "minority policy" since 1949 through the contradictory establishment and maintenance of "national regional autonomy" for ethnic minorities, simultaneous with the stated goal of assimilating all ethnic groups in China (Mackerras 2004) . Indeed, the "acceptance" of the state-idea of the PRC by China's ethnic minorities since 1949 has been varied, from the apparent acceptance of the Hui for example, and the periodic rejection of it by the Tibetans and Uighurs.
Yet since the launching of the Great Western Development there has been a shift of emphasis in the way in which the state's approach to ethnic minorities is framed. Nicolas …this landmark article read as a programmatic document, a disclosure of the "real objectives" of the campaign to "Open up the West", as opposed to the rhetoric of "common prosperity" which had prevailed until then. But it also signalled closure: as the long-sought objective of seamless integration of minority nationalities into the "Chinese nation" draws near, history has entered an end game, and there is no necessity to proceed with caution…This shift is thus essentially a narrowing between the unstated and the stated goals of policies regarding minority nationality areas. It reflects the new-found confidence that the party-state now has sufficient control and power to take any counter-measure needed (Becquelin 2004, 374) .
However, this assessment of the article may be over-stated. In particular a more careful analysis of Li's article suggests that while the state certainly perceives it to be the right historical "moment" in which to achieve the thorough integration of both the ethnic minorities and the regions they inhabit, it also recognises the challenges and obstacles that may prevent this development. According to Li, there are five major "aspects in handling national relations in western China": 1) Historically, national relations in western China has been a sensitive one. There are historical factors influencing national relations in these areas. 2) There is heavy religious influence in these areas, thus national relations are very complicated. 3) There are always disputes about boundaries, water, grassland, frost and minerals in these areas. There will be similar disputes in developing western China. 4) Cultural traditions and lifestyles of nationalities need to adapt to new social and economic developments. 5) Due to cultural and religious factors national relations in these areas are subject to international influences. (Li 2000) In essence, the Great Western Development, in the state's perspective, is about overcoming these obstacles. This rationale of economic development as a cure-all in the context of China's "nationality problem" and the precipitous historical "moment" for its implementation is also clearly expressed:
So the final solution for these problems lies in developing social productivity in areas of minority nationalities. The strategy to promote social and economic development of western China is a fundamental way to speed up the development of minority nationalities, and a necessary choice to solve China's nationality problems under new historical circumstances. (Li 2000. My emphasis)
Significantly, for the subsequent discussion of the contours of the Great Western Development in Xinjiang, Li also elucidated the state's conviction that "national unity" and "development" are inter-linked. Moreover, it also acknowledged, to a degree, that the process of accelerated economic development and integration entailed by the Great Western Development may actually exacerbate some of the factors that were identified by Li as affecting the "handling of national relations":
Implementing the Great Western Development strategy will provide the material foundation for strengthening national unity and social stability; while national unity and social stability will create a favourable environment for implementing the strategy. On the other hand, implementing the strategy may bring about new issues and problems which might challenge national unity and social stability. Implementing the strategy will lead to further opening-up. Overseas hostile forces will probably take this opportunity to penetrate China. We must be highly vigilant on this and take effective measures to safeguard national unity and social stability in order to smoothly implement the strategy (Li 2000. My emphasis).
Thus although the possibility of the Great Western Development exacerbating the situation in ethnic minority regions is acknowledged, it is conditioned by a predilection to blame external influences for complications in "national relations". Although statements such as these suggest that Becquelin has overstated the change in Chinese policy, Li's reference to the impact of the Great Western Development on the issue of population transfers, long a sensitive issue in the context of China's ethnic minority policies, does suggest a change in emphasis. 5 While stating that the first two decades of "reform and opening" caused population transfers to the eastern provinces, Li notes that the Great Western Development "will bring about a population flow to the west" (Li 2000) . This in itself is significant as the Chinese government throughout the 1990s denied that substantial in-migration of Han into ethnic minority regions such as Xinjiang was occurring. Interestingly, and perhaps suggestive of China's "new found confidence" in regard to ethnic minority policy, the article also acknowledges that this may cause inter-ethnic conflict:
At the same time new issues and problems may arise…It is important for the Great Western Development and national relations to handle this issue well. In keeping with the increased population flow of the various ethnic groups, there will be some changes in the proportions of the nationalities. There will also be some contradictions and friction in their contacts (Li 2000).
Li's prescription to handle this apparently inevitable side-affect of the Great Western Therefore, although the Great Western Development is concerned with addressing the uneven economic development of the "west", it will do so on the basis of preserving "national unity"
and "social stability" with the majority Han leading the way forward. As the subsequent discussion will suggest, however, it is the tensions and contradictions between the goals of "national unity", "social stability" and economic development encompassed in the Great Western Development that may in fact be generating dynamics of insecurity in the context of Xinjiang.
China's Program of Integration in Xinjiang and Societal Insecurity
Prior to addressing the question of the relationship between the dynamics of the Great Western Development and the situation in Xinjiang, it is useful to briefly recall the societal security perspective outlined earlier. As noted above, societal security is brought into question when a society believes that its "we" identity is being put in danger. The threatening of a society's "we" identity can be compromised through a range of actions, usually state-derived, such as restriction or control of a group's religious, linguistic, and cultural expression or outright suppression. Significantly, Roe suggests that when the "state machinery" is overwhelmingly controlled by the dominant society, "then not only might it be unwilling to provide societal security but may itself be posing the threat" (Roe 2005, 50) . How then does the threatened group protect its identity? Waever, notes that in contrast to the classic IR security dilemma that results in arms races/military competition, the "societal security dilemma" results most often in generating non-military means of defence. In such situations, particularly within multi-national states dominated by one major societal unit, the defence of a threatened society's identity will usually result in attempts to strengthen that society's cohesion:
For threatened societies, one obvious line of defensive response is to strengthen societal identity. This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure that the society reproduces itself (Waever 1993, 191) .
Although this dynamic, as will be outlined below, appears to be operating in the context of Xinjiang, it also needs to be pointed out that this process is not exclusively one way. That is to say, this notion of defending culture "with culture", can be exhibited by both the societal group under threat and the state. As noted above, much of the Chinese state's discourse regarding the Great Western Development, for example, maintains that it is necessary for ensuring national security and development, with the implication that those who oppose or disagree with the thrust of this program are thus threatening state security. This suggests the operation of a somewhat circular dynamic of action-reaction-response on behalf of both the state and societal groups, whereby the implementation of a range of policies in the Great Western Development threaten the societal security of the ethnic minorities, which induces efforts to strengthen societal cohesion that in turn are perceived by the state as jeopardising state security.
Threats to a society's identity can come from many directions, with economic, social and cultural policies of the state all potentially playing a role. In the context of Xinjiang, this is certainly the case. Key elements of this renewed focus on an outright assimilation of the "west" that are well attested in the case of Xinjiang include: increased Han in-migration and settlement; management/control of religious expression; restrictions on the use of minority languages, and political and economic disparities (Becquelin 2000; Mackerras 2001) . Another factor that is assuming increased importance in Xinjiang (but also in other regions of the "west") and interacting with those just noted concerns environmental degradation and water scarcity. Indeed, Homer-Dixon asserts that the operation of environmental degradation and water scarcity in combination with such policies as those above can induce "group identity"
conflicts -that is inter-ethnic conflict (Homer-Dixon 1994) . In the context of Xinjiang the response of the threatened society -the Uighur -to this program of state action has been multi-faceted and expressed a far from monolithic or consolidated ethnic identity. The construction of a distinct Uighur identity has been hampered by historical, religious and geographic cleavages and distinctions between the Turkic-speaking oasis dwellers of Xinjiang. More importantly, the (re)emergence of the ethnonym "Uighur" to refer to the Turkic-speaking, Muslim oasis-dwellers of Xinjiang and the evolution of a distinct identity based upon these notions of shared language, history and religion were stimulated by the incorporation of the region into the Chinese state during the first half of the twentieth century:
While the Uyghur have at times in their history been unified for particular sociopolitical purposes, for the most part the people now known by that name were scattered among disparate oases and tribal confederations. Out of opposition to other tribal confederations, and most notably the Chinese state, the people recognized as the Uyghur emerged (Gladney 2004, 209-210) .
Given the societal security perspective outlined above, this observation regarding the formation of Uighur identity is instructive in regard to potential implications of the state's actions and discourse in the context of the Great Western Development. The following section will outline the broad contours of the four major aspects of Chinese policy in Xinjiang noted above since the 1990s and suggest that the political, economic and social dynamics generated by them have induced insecurity amongst the Uighur population. period. Since 1999 (incidentally the beginning of the Great Western Development), the state has also begun a program to incorporate these "sojourners" into the major cities of Xinjiang and grant them access to social services (Becquelin 2004, 369-70) . Indeed, the perception that Xinjiang is being "swamped" with Han is often cited, both by external observers and Uighur émigré organisations, as a key concern of the Uighur and as a cause of Uighur opposition and resistance to Chinese rule (Bovingdon 2002, 47-52; Becquelin 2000, 75-77) .
Increased Han in-migration
4
Management and control of religious and cultural expression:
The post-1949 Chinese state, led by an avowedly Marxist-Leninist party, has always attempted to manage and control the Islamic religious confession of Xinjiang's major ethnic groups through a alternation of "soft" and "hard" policies. In general, the "soft" approach has involved the tolerance, and at times encouragement, of institutionalised Islam (through mosque construction, the Chinese Islamic Association etc) in order to gain the acquiescence of the ethnic minority population.
However, this is coupled with parallel "hard" strategies that are implemented when the state perceives that the practice of religion is a "threat" to security. This theme has been particularly evident since the 1990s, with regular campaigns throughout the region to regulate the rate of mosque construction, the re-education and "reform" of imams and greater regulation or closure of madrassahs (Islamic schools). Such cycles of "hard" and "soft" The languages of the minority nationalities have very small capacities and do not contain many of the expressions in modern science and technology, which makes education in these concepts impossible. This is out of step with the 21 st century. That is why the Chinese language is now used as the medium of instruction from the third grade of primary school in Xinjiang, to overcome the language barrier and obstacles to development. This way, the quality of the Uygur youth will not be poorer than that of their Han peers when they grow up.(Wen wei po 2002 2 August cited in Becquelin 2004, 376) .
This clearly carries the implicit notion common in much recent state discourse regarding ethnic minorities noted earlier, that the ethnic minorities are backward and may only "develop" and become "modern" with the assistance of the Chinese state. Moreover, in the post-9/11 environment one scholar has asserted that current state policy toward ethnic minority languages in Xinjiang "implicitly categorizes the Uyghur language as disloyal", although this may over-state the case somewhat (Dillon 2003) . The issue of ethnic minority language in Xinjiang is also complicated by the fact that many Uighurs now view fluency in Chinese language as a prerequisite for higher education and greater employment opportunities (Rudelson & Jankowiak 2004, 336 ). Yet, this in itself demonstrates the pressure placed upon ensuring the continuity of a key component of Uighur identity, the Uighur language.
Political and economic disparities:
A key factor in the ensuring the political dominance of the Han in Xinjiang, and conversely the political marginalisation of the Uighur, has been the function of China's system of "national regional autonomy". In contrast to the Soviet system whereby its "national minorities" were granted a federal system of national republics with a theoretical right to secession, the CCP permitted the PRC's ethnic minorities a system of limited territorial autonomy. In Xinjiang three levels of "autonomous government" were composition of its population. The population of Xinjiang in 1955, the year "regional autonomy" was implemented, has been variously estimated at some four and a half to five million, some seventy to seventy-five per cent of which was accounted for by the Uighur, while the Han accounted for perhaps five per cent. Therefore, in Xinjiang power and representation within the proposed autonomous government was to be divided amongst thirteen constituent ethnic minorities even though the Uighur were evidently in the majority.
Moreover, the titular ethnic group in seventeen out of the twenty-seven "autonomous" units established in Xinjiang after 1955 accounted for less than fifty percent of the population of the autonomous unit. The establishment of these "subautonomies" served the major goals of entrenching the idea that Xinjiang belonged to the thirteen officially recognised ethnic groups and of countering the demographic and potential political weight of the Uighur (McMillen 1981, 66-70; Bovingdon 2004) . Significantly, although the state's policy on regional autonomy explicitly states that the head of an autonomous region, prefecture or county must be a member of the ethnic group exercising autonomy, in actuality it is the CCP that wields real power in the region. One recent account observed that ethnic minorities are underrepresented in the CCP comprising around 37 per cent of the 958 000 party members in Xinjiang (Mackerras 2004b ). As such the CCP apparatus in Xinjiang is dominated by Han, a phenomena that is highlighted by the fact that all first Party secretaries across the one hundred and twenty-four prefectural, municipal, and county levels of the Party in Xinjiang, none are from an ethnic minority (Becquelin 2004, 363) . Moreover, as a strategic region with a Better communication and transport facilities confer genuine and broad benefits yet at the same time facilitate Han in-migration. This in turn provides economic stimulus but gives rise to competition over resources. Construction projects create jobs, yet often these go to Han immigrants rather than local minorities (Weimer 2004, 188) .
There is also a continued rural-urban economic disparity, with the annual urban GDP per capita in 2003 standing at 14.3% (7300 yuan) compared to 8.8% (1861 yuan) in rural areas. This is significant as the urban populations of Xinjiang are predominantly Han while the rural population remains predominantly ethnic minority (Becquelin 2004, 371; Bachman 2004, 161-173) . The economic role of the quasi-military organisation of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) also deserves mention as it highlights the state-building imperatives behind the state's economic development strategy. The XPCC serves a dual roleas a conduit for Han colonisation and as an instrument of integration. The XPCC has 2.46 million, predominantly Han members, while it operates some 427 industrial and commercial enterprises, numerous state farms that occupy a third of the region's arable land, and most of the region's "reform-through-labour" camps, generating 13.2% of the region's GDP.
Furthermore, the XPPC's operation directly under the State Council of the PRC makes it, "vitually independent from the Xinjiang Autonomous Region's government", while some 80% of its budget also comes directly from the central government (Becquelin 2004, 366-70) .
The XPCC is thus a powerful colonising force through its absorption of Han migrants, securing territory through a string of cities, farm complexes and industries, and ensuring security through its paramilitary functions (Becquelin 2004, 366-70; Seymour & Anderson 1998; Seymour 2000) .
Environmental degradation & water scarcity:
The issues of environmental degradation and water scarcity should also be considered in the context of discussing the societal security of Xinjiang's ethnic minorities. The Chinese government has itself noted that a significant amount of desertification has taken place in Xinjiang as a result of the large-scale process of Han in-migration to the region since 1949, but particularly during the 1990s. In particular, it has been noted that some 300km of the Tarim River and its tributaries (in southern Xinjiang) has entirely dried up since the 1970s as the result of urbanization, extensive irrigation and land reclamation projects. The state's response has been to embark upon a "rehabilitation" program for the Tarim River by diverting water from northern Xinjiang to the south in order to "restore water to 240km of the dried up river bed" Continued depletion of the region's water resources and desertification could thus contribute to further pressures on the ethnic minority population of Xinjiang. Finally, Xinjiang is also home to some of China's most important nuclear facilities, including the testing ground in the Lop Nor desert. The environmental impact of China's nuclear tests, have also been a cause of grievance for the region's ethnic minorities. In particular the late 1980s and early 1990s saw a number of protests against the continued operation of China's nuclear facilities at Lop Nor (Dillon 1995: 19 ; East Turkistan Information Bulletin 1993).
As we have seen China's approach to Xinjiang is thus defined by a dual strategy of rapid economic modernisation and development, and a zero-tolerance approach to expressions of autonomy or secession. Indeed, a further indication of the logic or rationale driving the In the state's perception, and implied in the above comment, "protection" of ethnic minority cultural "heritage" can only be achieved through further modernisation, and therefore further integration with the Chinese state. The progress of Chinese policy in Xinjiang since the initiation of the Great Western Development has certainly reflected this notion of the Chinese state as the agent of modernisation. As we have seen, the program of development in Xinjiang has been underpinned by such strategies as rapid Han in-migration and zero-tolerance for expressions of ethnic minority autonomy that can be seen to contribute to societal insecurity amongst the non-Han population of the region. An increasingly important element in this latter respect in the post-9/11 international environment has been the Chinese state's categorisation of violent incidents of Uighur opposition to Chinese rule as "terrorism".
The Discourse of Uighur "Terrorism": An External Manifestation of the Great Western Development?
Although much Uighur opposition to Chinese rule is non-violent and often takes the form of passive, "everyday resistance", it is important to examine the Chinese government's discourse regarding Uighur "terrorism" in Xinjiang because, as I shall suggest below, it serves as a supportive pillar both domestically and internationally for its program of development in the region (Bovingdon 2002, 45-53; Smith 2002) In the early twentieth century, and later, a small number of separatists and religious extremists in Xinjiang, influenced by the international trend of religious extremism and national chauvinism, politicized the unstandardized geographical term "East Turkistan", and fabricated an "ideological and theoretical system" on the so-called "independence of East Turkistan"…They incited all ethnic groups speaking Turki and believing in Islam to join hands to create a theocratic state. They denied the history of the great motherland jointly built by all ethnic groups of China. They clamored for "opposition to all ethnic groups other than the Turks" and for the "annihilation of pagans", asserting that "China had been the This account of the development of Uighur separatism in Xinjiang also very clearly projects into the past the Chinese state's contemporary concerns and fears regarding Uighur separatism in the region. This discourse not only presents China's security concerns in Xinjiang as part of the wider international "War on Terror", but also elucidates it in a particularly strident manner to convey the "clear and present" danger of Uighur "terrorism" to China's national security.
As noted earlier, "securitisation theory" argues that security issues are constructed "according to a dialectic between securitizing state agents and an accepting or rejecting public audience, mediated by a stock discourse of security characteristics such as urgency and exceptionality" (Neal 2006, 34) . In the case of Xinjiang, it is difficult to establish explicitly whether the public audience is "accepting or rejecting" of this discourse, but as alluded to by the examples above (and outlined below) the state could be seen as embarking upon such a project. The report cited above claims that since 1990 Xinjiang has witnessed "over 200 terrorist incidents" including explosions, assassinations, attacks on police and government institutions, crimes of poison and arson, establishment of secret training bases and plotting and organising disturbances. Moreover, these attacks are claimed to have resulted in the deaths and injury of one hundred and sixty-two and four hundred and forty people respectively. The document also identifies a number of "East Turkistan terrorist forces", such as the "Uighur Liberation Organisation" (ULO) and the "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" (ETIM), which it claims were responsible for these incidents. James Millward has demonstrated, however, in his detailed examination of violent separatism in Xinjiang that the Chinese government's account is far from systematic or consistent. For example, from the data supplied in the Chinese document the total number of deaths directly attributed to "terrorism" in Xinjiang between 1990 and 2001 is fifty-seven, while the number injured is three hundred and sixty-two, substantially less than the figures of one hundred and sixty-two and four hundred and forty people killed and injured stated in the introduction to the report.
Moreover, most of the deaths and injuries for which evidence is provided occurred as a result of small-scale incidents with only one or two victims (Millward 2004, 12-22 Significantly, the various SCO meetings since 2001 have also been explicit in identifying one of the major goals of the organisation to be to combat the "three evils of extremism, terrorism and separatism" (Chung 2004, 990-91; Swanstrom 2005; Ong 2005, 429-431; Tarimi 2004) .
In this regard Michael Dillon has noted that China, "By defining all separatist activity in Xinjiang as terrorist, the government of the PRC is hoping to obtain carte blanche from the international community to take whatever action it sees fit in the region" (Dillon 2004, 162 ).
This process also has an important domestic counter-point that is hinted at by the policies and discourse of the state's program of integration and development in Xinjiang that were examined earlier -the Chinese state's move beyond a multi-national "patriotism" towards a more consolidated, and perhaps confident, Chinese nationalism. As we have seen, perhaps those to bear the full brunt of the Chinese state's vigour will be its ethnic minority populations, particularly those such as the Uighur who are strategically located and have a history of opposition and separateness from China. This paper, in exploring the applicability of notions of human security to China's evolving approach toward its multi-ethnic population, proposed three major questions in the specific context of Xinjiang. First, which collectivity is the state acting to protect? Second, how do the actions taken to protect the security of the state impact upon the societal security of the constituent populations of the state? Third, does the Chinese state's actions and discourse exhibit a "securitization" dynamic whereby key issues are deemed to be defined by "urgency" and "exceptionality"? As outlined above, the discourse surrounding the state's "Great Western Development" strategy, suggests that while the state continues to stress the need to address the problems of uneven development in ethnic minority regions, it nonetheless maintains that this will be done on the basis of preserving "national unity" and "social stability" with the dominant ethnic group -the Han -as the leading agents of modernization. Meanwhile, the discussion of the contours of state policy in Xinjiang over the 1991 to 2006 period demonstrated that elements and side-effects of the state's development strategy -such as Han in-migration and environmental degradation -can be seen to have exacerbated inter-ethnic relations in the region. Moreover, the societal security perspective suggested that when a society perceives that it's "we" identity may be under threat, it will usually result in attempts to strengthen societal cohesion through revitalisation of aspects of collective identity such as language and religion. In the case of the Uighur, the paper highlighted the state's ongoing concern to manage and control the practice of aspects of Uighur identity, such as religious observance, which have experienced a revival since 1991.
The discussion also highlighted that such processes of increased state control in these spheres have also developed simultaneously with further marginalisation of Xinjiang's ethnic minorities, but particularly the Uighur, from avenues of political representation and economic advancement. Finally, the discussion of the discourse surrounding the issue of Uighur "terrorism" in the post-9/11 context also noted the interaction between elements of China's strategy of integration and control and its foreign policy agenda with respect to the Central Asian republics. Indeed, as noted above, the "securitization" of Uighur terrorism through the deployment of a consistent state-discourse regarding alleged connections between Uighur organisations and "international terrorism" has been successful for China, particularly in its relations neighbouring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, it is also clear from the preceding discussion that in spite of some correlations between societal security theory and developments within Xinjiang over the 1991-2006 period the Uighur response to threats to its "we" identity cannot be said at this juncture to constitute a genuine challenge to the state. This suggests that further theoretical development of the concept of societal security and further exploration of the interaction between ethnic identities and the Chinese state's modernization project are required in order to "flesh out" the initial picture of the relationship between identity and security in Xinjiang presented here.
NOTES
1 The author would like to thank members of the Griffith Asia Institute's "China Policy Project" for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper, and Mr. Liu Xian for his translation of Chinese sources.
2 Xinjiang, in the far north-west of China, is China's largest administrative unit, accounts for one sixth of its total territory, shares borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Mongolia and is populated by thirteen, predominantly Turkic-Muslim ethnic groups. The thirteen officially recognised ethnic groups of Xinjiang are: Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Uzbek, Hui, Mongol, Tartar, Russian, Solon, Xibo, Manchu, and Han.
3 There are fifty-six officially recognised ethnic groups or minzu in China, including the majority Han (Mackerras 2004a) 4 Between 1911 and 1949 Xinjiang was dominated by independent Han "warlords" and experienced major Soviet influence. However, the Uighur and other ethnic groups established two nascent independent states -the Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkestan (TIRET) in 1933-34 and the East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in 1944-49 (Forbes 1986; Wang 1999) . 5 The issue of population transfers to ethnic minority regions has been particularly evident in ongoing controversies regarding Chinese policy towards Tibet, although recent research suggests that such claims have been over-stated by Tibetan exile organisations (Suatman 2006) . In the context of Xinjiang, the claim that the Uighur and other ethnic groups were being diluted by Han in-migration has also been evident for some decades. Although in Xinjiang the dynamic of Han in-migration to the region has undergone fluctuations, generally correlated to changing state policy. For example, the Han proportion of the population actually fell during the 1980s, from 40.45% in 1982 to 37.58% in 1990, with the relaxation of the coercive population transfers of the Maoist period. This figure then rose substantially to 40.6% in 2000 as the state's program of economic reform and development encouraged Han in-migration (Mackerras 2001; Becquelin 2004) .
